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ABS11<ACT 
This paper proves the existence of a stationary distribution 
for a class of Markov voting models, We assume that alternatives to 
replace the current status quo arise probabilistically, with the 
probability distribution at time t+l having support set equal to the 
set of alternatives that defeat, according to some voting rule, the 
current status quo at time t. When preferences are based on Euclidean 
distance, it is shown that for a wide class of voting rules, a 
limiting distribution exists. For the special case of majority rule, 
not only does a limiting distribution always exist, but we obtain 
bounds for the concentration of the limiting distribution around a 
centrally located set, The implications are that under Markov voting 
models, small deviations from the conditions for a core point will 
still leave the limiting distribution quite concentrated around a 
generalized median point, Even though the majority relation is 
totally cyclic in such situations, our results show that such chaos is 
not probabilistically significant, 
LIMITING DIS1RIBUTIONS FOR CONTINUOUS STATE MARKOV V OTING MODELS 
John A. Ferejohn, Richard D. McKelvey, and Edward VI. Packel
1, IN1RODUCTION 
It is becoming increasingly evident that nondeterministic 
models of individual and group behavior have an important role to play 
in the social sciences, Such models can provide relief from 
impossibility results, and may yield equilibria not generally present 
in deterministic formulations, In the realm of game-theoretic models 
of committee voting there are an abundance of solution concepts, but 
none are fully adequate in that they can often fail to make a 
prediction (equilibria do not exist) or they predict indiscriminately 
(the set of solutions is unworkably large), Nondeterministic 
solutions, on the other l1and, afford the possibility of always 
existing while discriminating probabilistically over any set of 
possible outcomes, In addition, probabilistic solutions may reduce to 
nondeterministic solutions when the latter do exist and are 
appropriate, 
A natural and widely applicable means of generating 
probabilistic predictions is provided by Markov processes, For voters 
making a choice from a finite set of alternatives, a finite state 
discrete time Markov chain model of sequential voting is developed by 
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel (1980], When the alternatives form a 
compact subset of 2m, a continuous state Markov process can be used to
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generate a probabilistic solution concept (Packel (1981]). Each of 
these models assumes that alternatives to replace the current status 
quo arise probabilistically, with the probability distribution of time 
t + 1 having support equal to the set of alternatives that defeat (by 
some voting rule) the current status quo at time t, Once this 
probability distribution is obtained, one can then try to determine 
the limiting distribution (i. e. ,  the steady state probabilities) for 
the Markov process. For a finite set of alternatives, this procedure 
is straightforward, When alternatives are a general subset of Rm, a 
number of interesting and important questions arise about the 
existence and structure of the limiting distribution. In this paper 
we formulate and address these questions, 
When the alternative space is compact and voter preferences 
are ''reasonable,'' it is shown in Packel [1981] that a limiting 
probability distribution must exist and will be concentrated at the 
strong equilibrium if suoh an equilibrium exists, In the absence of 
an equilibrium, however, one would like to know to what extent the 
distribution is concentrated in the Pareto set or some other centrally 
located region in the alternative space, 
If we allow the alternative space to be all of Rm, additional 
subtleties arise, A result by McKelvey (1976, 1979] shows that, for 
almost all distributions of voter preferences, any point in im can be 
reached from any other point by a finite sequence of majority rule 
votes, This result suggests that any of the following disjoint 
conclusions might plausibly hold: 
(a) The limiting distribution may fail to exist, 
(b) The limiting distribution will exist, but fail to 
(c) 
concentrate in the Pareto set, or in any centrally 
located region, 
The limiting distribution will exist and have most 
of its probability near some centrally located 
region in the Pareto set, 
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As we show in the final section, both (a) and (b) may occur if 
some contrived assumptions are made about the support sets for the 
transition probabilities, However, under more reasonable assumptions 
about the transition probabilities, and assuming circular preferences 
for the voters, we show that a limiting distribution must always 
exist. This is true regardless of the structure of the decisive 
coalitions which generate the social preference relation -- even, for 
example, if the underlying game is not proper, We can also obtain 
some weak bounds on the limiting probability distribution of such a 
process and its relation to the Pareto set, 
In the special case of majority rule, we get much stronger 
results, Here we not only get existence of the limiting distribution, 
but we can bound the limiting distribution in terms of its 
concentrations around a more centrally located set. It follows from 
the results here that if the distribution of voter ideal points is 
''close '' to symmetric, i.e. if it is close the situation when a core 
exists, then the limiting distribution will be quite concentrated near 
a ''generalized median.'' Even when there is less symmetry, the 
distribution will be concentrated around a centrally located region 
which for large numbers of voters will be contained in the Pareto set 
and will also contain Kramer's minimax set, Thus, the class of 
probabilistic solution concepts we consider are consistent with the 
chaos of total cyclicity suggested by McKelvey's theorem, but our 
results show that such chaos is not probabilistically significant, 
2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
We assume a set N = {1, 2,. . . ,n} of yoters, a set X � 1.m of 
alternatiyes, and, for each i a N, a complete binary relation 
Ri �X x X representing voter i's preferences. We interpret Ri as
weak preference, denoting its asymmetric part (strict preference) by 
Pi. Any nonempty subset C of N is called a coalition, with lcl 
denoting the number of members in C, For any x, y a X, preferences 
are defined for coalitions by, 
(2.1) 
We impose the structure of a simple game on N. Thus we are 
given a collection Jl. of subsets of N with the property that 
C e .J'l, C � C' => C' s J!. (2.2) 
The collection YI. can be thought of as the set of ' 'winning, '' or 
''decisive'' coalitions. (Note that we do not necessarily assume that 
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the set! is generated by a proper game.) 
We can then define the group preference relation Pc X x  X by 
xPy <=> xPCy for some C s !· (2 . 3) 
Define for any x s X, and i s N, 
Pi(x) {y s XlyPix). (2.4) 
For any C 5::_ N, define
Pc(x) {y s XlyPcxl (2.5) 
and 
P (x) {y s XlyPx). (2, 6) 
A core point for the group preference relation, P, is any x s X for 
which P(x) = 6. Some of the results we obtain will require absolute 
majority rule for the group preference, In this case we define ! by 
w = { c c N: I c I > .!!] - - 2 '
and we denote t11e induced majority relation by PM, 
3 • TIIE MARKOV MODEL 
(2. 7) 
Let M denote the Lebesgue measurable subsets of X and let µ 
denote Lebesgue measure on im. We start with a function 
p : M x X -> R satisfying 
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(i) p(' ,x) is a probability measure on M for each x e X. 
(ii) p (A,') is a Lebesgue mensurable function for each 
A s !!. 
(iii) x BA and p(A,x) > 0 =) 3y B A such that yPx.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard assumptions for generating a 
Markov process with stationary transition probabilities, Thus the 
following interpretation is placed on p, Given that alternative 
(state) x has occurred nt time t and given A s !!. p(A,x) gives the
probability that an alternative will be selected from A at time 
t + 1 (t = 0,1,2,, , , ), Condition (iii) requires that a set A of 
alternatives excluding x, none of which is preferred to x, cannot have 
a positive transition probability from x. Intuitively, any new 
alternative selected at time t + 1 must defeat the status quo 
alternative of time t, Throughout, we will use the following 
notation, For each x s X, 
For each A s !!, 
Px IM-> i is the measure p(' ,x) 
PA X -> i is the function p(A, ' ) 
(3.1) 
We are concerned in this paper with the existence and 
properties of the limiting (or steady state) probability p• : M -> l 
of the Markov process determined by p. To define p•, we first obtain 
the k-step density functions inductively as follows: 
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(3.2) 
• We now define px by 
(3.3) 
provided this limit exists and that p• is a probability measure over 'X x 
for all x s X. In situations we shall be considering, p• will x 
frequently turn out to be independent of x, We can therefore regard 
p• as a function from M to R and for any measurable A 5::_X, p•(A)
denotes the limiting probability of the process ''ending up'' in A, 
When such a limiting distribution p• : M -> l exists, the
Markov process detern1ined by p is called stationary and p • is any 
probability measure defined recursively by the equation 
(3.4) 
We refer the reader to Doob (1953] for expository details of these 
Markov process ideas, 
Under specific assumptions on p, on the voting rule, and on 
the types of individual preferences, the probability measure 
determined by p is the end result of the voting models developed in 
Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel [1980], and Packel [1981]. The solution 
concept obtained has been called the stochastic solution. In what 
follows, we examine the qualitative behavior of the stochastic 
solution and some of its natural extensions, 
4. SPECIAL ASSUMPTIONS
All of our results will require added structure on the Markov 
process p, as well as on individual preferences. For any A 5::. X, let 
XA : X -> (0, 1) denote the characteristic function of A: 
-
{ 1 if y sA 
XA(y) 0 if y i A 
We make the following assumption for the transition function p. 
Assumption 1 (Preferred set Assumption): For all x s X and 
A e M, p (A,x) can be written in the form 
p (A, x) = PA(x) = px(A) = 
{ XA (x) 
� aj(x)µ(A n D.(x))jkr J 
if P(x) 6 
if P(x) ;, 6 
where aj : X -> l is continuous with aj(x) > 0 for all x, and
U Pc(x) for all j = 1,2, • • •  ,J, and !!j 5::_ Ji., 
Ce!!j 
(4.1) 
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This assumption on p says that the transition probabilities 
from an x s X are determined by selecting various collections of 
winning coalitions, identifying the set of alternatives preferred to x 
by each such collection, and then taking some weighted combination of 
uniform distributions over these sets, It should be noted that many 
natural conditions imposed on group voting behavior in the literature 
can be captured under this assumption. We give three examples: 
PSAl: Let Ilj = {N} with J = 1, so that Dj(x) becomes the set PN(x) of
alternatives unanimously preferred to x. Then the form of p requires 
that, for an x outside the Pareto set, its successor will bo chosen by 
means of a uniform distribution on PN(x). For x in the Pareto set, 
the process stops (points in the Pareto set are absorbing states). In 
the limit one would expect this process to choose points from the 
Pareto set with probability one. 
PSA2: Let J = 1, and Hj = {C1, • •  , ,Cm} be the collection of minimal 
winning coalitions. Then D.(x) is the set P(x) of points which are 
J 
preferred by some winning coalitions to x. The resulting transition 
function is a uniform distribution over P(x). 
coalitions J = m, and let Ilj = {Cj}' Then D.(x) is the set Pc (x), J j 
For each x with P (x) f 6 and any j = 1,2, • • •  , J set 
aj(x) = 1/( 2 µ(D.(x))). The resulting transition function p assigns i=l 1 
probabilities weighted in proportion to the number of minimal winning 
coalitions preferring points to x. This is the form of the models 
developed in Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel [1980] and Packel [1981]. 
Also, throughout the remainder of the paper, we require the 
following assumption on individual preferences. 
Assumption 2: X lm, and each voter has Type 1 preferences. I.e., 
for each i s N, 3 xi s X such that V x,y s X 
xRiy <=> llx - x
iii i lly - xiii
Tho vector xi is called voter i's ideal point. 
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Assumption 2 is common in the voting literature, and says that 
each voter's utility is a monotone decreasing function of Euclidean 
distance from some ideal point. In other words indifference surfaces 
are spheres, 
The following lemma establishes continuity of the transition 
probability functions for any Markov voting process satisfying 
Assumptions 1 and 2. 
Lemma 4.1, Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for each A e M. PA(x) is a 
continuous function of x on the set {x s XI P (x) F 6}. 
Proof. Let lf(X) denote the measurable functions on X. It is easy to 
verify that, for each i, the mapping fi : X -> M(X) defined by
(4. 2) 
is continuous in the l 1 norm. Thus, for each j, the mapping 
11 
X -> M_(X) defined by
(4.3) 
is also continuous in the l1 norm. This follows because gj can be
written in the form 
where 
gj(x) = max fc(x), 
Ce]!j 
But then we can write, for any A s ,M, 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4. 6) 
and it follows that µ(A n D.(x)) is continuous in x, because since J 
gj(x) is continuous, for any s > 0 and x0 s X, we can find a 
neighborhood N (x0) of x0 for which x s N(x0) implies 
But then 
lµ(A n D.(x)) - µ(An D.(x0>>1 J J 
So µ(A n Dj(x)) is continuous, 
Now 
k 
) aj(x)µ(A n Dj(x)) Jfri 
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(4.7) 
(4.8) 
which is the sum of the product of continuous functions, so the result 
follows. 
5. EXISTENCE OF A LIMITING PROBABILITY DIS1RIBUTION. 
Q.E.D. 
This section shows existence of a stationary distribution for 
any Markov voting process satisfying assumptions 1 and 2. In 
addition, we get some weak bounds on the concentration of the limiting 
probability distributions around the set of Pareto optimals. To do 
this, we define B0 to be a closed ball of minimal diameter containing
all ideal points. We then find bounds on the limiting probability 
distribution in terms of the proportion of the distribution which lies 
within a given distance from the center of B0, 
More specifically, we define 
(x s Im I llx - y•ll i max llxi - y•llJ isN 
where y• s Im is chosen to minimize max llxi - y•ll. Set isN 
t• = 2 max llxi - y•ll to be the diameter of B0, and define, for isN
j = 0, 1, 2, . .. 
Bj = (x e Im I 2llx - y•ll i (2j + l)t•}, 
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(5.1) 
(5.2) 
Let Aj denote the annulus in I
m determined by Bj-l and Bj, so 
that Aj = Bj - Bj-l for j = 1, 2, • • •  (and set Ao= B0), See Figure 1 
for an example of this construction for a particular configuration of 
7 voters in two dimensions. 
For the following lemma, we define cID(t, t0) to be them­
dimensional cardioid whose boundary, in m-dimensional spherical 
coordinates is defined by the equation 
See Appendix A for a more rigorous definition of cID(t, t0).
(5.3) 
Setting a = sin-l ( :o), where -� i a if• it is shown in
Appendix A that the m dimensional Lebesgue content of cID(t, t0) is
given by: 
.ll. J! (t sin 01 + t0)ru cosm-2 e1de1, (5 .4) 
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When t0 "'0, (5.3) becomes the formula for a sphere, and µ[C
m(t, t0)J 
reduces to the m-dimensional Lebesgue content of a sphere of diameter 
t, In this case we write 
cID( t, 0) (5 .5) 
We now seek lower bounds on the limiting probability that the 
• process will end up within each ball Bj(i, e, , bounds on p (Bj)) for a 
transition density function satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, This will 
tell us, for a general configuration of ideal points within B0, to 
what extent the limiting distribution is concentrated near the 
''centrally located ' '  region determined by the set B0, For each 
j, k = 0, 1, 2, , , , ,  define nonnegative real numbers qj, k by 
(5.6) 
The following lemma obtains bounds for the qj, k based on the above 
expressions for cID(t, t0) and S
m(t).
Lemma 5.1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the transition function p 
sa ti sf ies: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
q 2. I' fSm( 2k+l l ] j, k µ[cID(2j+l,1)]
for 0 i k i j-2, j .L 2 
or k = j, j .L 1 
q 2. µ[Cm(Zi-1,-1)] for k = j - 1, j, k µ[Cm(2j+l,1)] 
for k > 
ANNULUS CONSTRUCTION FOR A 
PARTICULAR SET OF IDEAL POINTS 
Figure 1 
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Proof: Follows f rom Lemma Al and A2 of Appendix A, 
By using the qj, k estimates, we now bound the original 
continuous·state Markov process by a countably infinite state Markov 
chain. The states correspond to the annuli {Aj} J=O' In the
transition matrix S = [s ]� for the Markov chain, sj, k j , k  j, k=o 
represents the 1 step probability of reaching state k, given that j is 
the current state, We define S as follows: 
First, set 
I' [Sm( 2k+l)] 
µ [Cm(2j+l, 1)] 
11rcm<21 - 1.-1)] 
µ[Cm(2j + 1,1)]
1 
0 
for O i k i j-2, j 2. 2 
or k = j, j 2. 1 
for k = j - 1 
J 2. 2 
for k > j 
otherwise 
Then define rj, k recursively such that 
and then, set 
if k = 0 
otherwise 
The rj, k give the cumulative densities for the transition process 
defined by sj, k' We must modify the natural bounds 
;
j, k given in
(5. 7) 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
(5.7) to those given by rj, k in (5.8) for technical reasons, which 
will become apparent in the proof of Theorem 1. The definition of S 
is motivated by the fact that its transition probabilities give� 
pull towards the center A0 and � pull outward than is present in 
the original Markov process, In other words, for all x E X, if
x a Aj, then 
16 
(5.10) 
We first find steady state probabilities for S and then prove that a 
stationary limiting distribution p• must exist for the original Markov 
process p, and further that p• is at least as concentrated as the 
limiting distribution generated by S, 
Lemma 5.2: The Markov chain S defined by (5.9) has a convergent 
limiting distribution. 
Proof: We use Theorem 7 of Kushner ([1971], p. 211, sec also the 
Corollary on the same page), Since all states communicate, we need 
only show that for all but a finite number of states, j, the expected 
state after one transition is less than or equal to j - 1, I.e., we 
must show, for all but a finite number of j, 
(5 .11) 
But 
Now 
j� j� 
(j + 1) [ 1 - 2_ s.k] + (j - 2) [ l sjk]kCO J k=O 
(j + 1) - 3rj,j-2
Assume the minimum is achieved at rj•,t•• Then there are four
possible oases, 
Case I. k• = j• - 2. (Note here, j = j•,) Then 
CZj• - 3)m = C2j - 3)m 
(2j• + 3)m (2j + 3)m 
Case II. k• = j• - 1, (Note here, j L j• L j - l,) Then
- µrrmc21• - 1. -1)1 L µCsmc21• - 3)1 rj•,k• = µ[cm(2j• + 1, l)] µ[Sm(2j• + 3)] 
CZj• - 3)m L C2j - 3)m 
(2j• + 3)m (2j + 3)m 
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(5.12) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
Case III. k• = j•, (Note here. j L j• L j - 2.) Then
It follows that 
so 
so, for large j, 
L 1,rsm(2j• + 1)] 
µ[Sm(2j• + 3)] 
(Zj• + llm L C2j• - 3)m L (2j - 3)m 
(2j• + 3)m (2j• + 3)m (2j + 3)m 
- C2j - 3)m r .• t• = 1 L • 3 ' (2j + 3)m 
(Zj - 3)m r L --j,J-2 (2j + 3)m
rj,j-2 -> 1 as j -> m 
�� ksjk i (j + 1) - 3rj,j-Z � j - 1
as we wished to show, 
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(5.16) 
(5.17) 
(5 .18) 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
Q.E, D, 
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We let s• = {si•}�=O denote the limiting distribution for the 
Markov chain S, It follows that for all k 
� SJ.•sjk j�O 
(5.21) 
Further, let r• . "' . {ri}i=O be the cumulative density of s i,e,, for 
all k, 
k 
2 
• Si i=O 
We can now present an existence theorem for the limiting 
distribution of the Markov voting models we are studying, 
Theorem 1: Given a Markov process p satisfying Assumptions 1 - 2, a 
limiting distribution p• exists, Furthermore, any limiting 
distribution p• is more concentrated on the sets Bk than the process 
S, I.e., for all k, 
(5. 22) 
Proof; If P(x0) = 6 for some x0 s I
m, then set p•(A) = XA(x0), It 
follows easily that this is a stationary distribution for p. Further 
x0 s B0• Otherwise, taking x s B0 to minimize llx0 - xii, we have 
xPixO for all i s N, implying xPx0• But then p•(Bk) = 1 for all k,
and (5 .22) is satisfied, So we assume P(x) F 6 for all x & Im. Then, 
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the theorem follows by application of Corollary 1 of Green, McKelvey 
and Packel [1981], Thus S defines a Markov process s : Z. x 7. -> l on 
the Borel sets � o.f Z , (the natural numbers), where, for any A a Z, 
j 8 z. 
s (A, j) 
Let K X -> Z be the mapping 
K(x) k XA (x) k 
(5 .23) 
(5.24) 
By construction, under this mapping, for all x BX, if K(x) = j (i.e., 
x B Aj), then by ( 5 .10), p(Bk, x) 2. rj, k' In other words, letting 
Tk = { t B z I t i k},
-1 Px ° K (Tk) = Px (Bk) = p(Bk' x) (5, 25) 
2. rj,k = sK(x)(Tk) 
Thus, the Markov process s stochastically dominates p with respect to 
K. Further, by construction, if i 2. j, then rik i rjk for all k. So 
the process s is stochastically increasing, Finally, by Lemma 4,1, 
since P(x) F 6 for all x & Im, p(A,x) is a continuous function of x 
for each fixed A, Therefore, the theorem follows as a direct 
application of the cited corollary. 
Q.E.D. 
6, LIMITING DIS1RIBUTION S FOR MAJORITY PROCESSES. 
The previous section placed no restriction on the underlying 
coalition structure generating the Markov process, Here we assume 
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majority rule, and using methods very similar to the previous section, 
get considerably tighter bounds on the concentration of the limiting 
distribution, 
Assumption 3: P = pM, {x & X : P(x) = 6} = 6 and the transition 
function p has the form p(A,x) = a(x)•µ(A n D(x)) where 
D(x) = U Pc(x) and a(x) = 1/µ(D(x)). 
Cs.l\'. 
Assumption 3 says that the voting rule is majority rule, and no 
majority rule core exists, which of course is the generic state of 
affairs, Also, when Assumption 2 is combined with Assumption 3 it 
follows from Theorem 1 of McKelvey [1976] that any point in X can be 
reached by a finite sequence of majority rule votes from any other 
point. Assumption 3 imposes a uniform distribution over the set of 
points that defeat a given point, as in example PSA2. 
Now, for any a B 1.m and c e I. write
II(a,c) 
(6.1) 
H(a,c) 
Tho hyperplane Il(a,c) is called a median hyperplane iff 
22 
(6.2) 
We now let B0 be a closed ball of minimum diameter such that 
every median hyperplane has a nonempty intersection with B0, Assume 
B0 can be written as follows. 
{x e l.m I 2llx - 'Yll i t} (6,3) 
As before, we define a series of concentric spheres around y as 
follows: For j = 0,1,,,. define 
Bj = {x s l.
m I 2llx - 'Yll i (2j + l)t}, (6.4) 
and define 
(6,5) 
See Figure 2 for an example of this construction for a particular 
configuration of 7 voters in 2 dimensions, 
Now define, for each j,k = 0 ,1,2,, •• nonnegative real numbers 
(6,6) 
We then obtain the following analogue of Lemma 5.1: 
Lemma 6,1; Given Assumptions 1 - 3, the transition function p 
Figure 2 : ANN!JLus CONSTRUCTION FOR A PARTICULAR SET OF IDEAL POINTS UNDER MAJORITY RULE (ASSVMPTION 3) 
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satisfies: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
q l µCsm(2k + 1)] j,k µ [c111(2j + 1, 1)] 
q 111Ci::
m��U - 1, -1}] 
j,k µ[Cm(2j + 1, l)]
qj,k 1 
for 0 i k i j 2 I j l 2 
or k = j, j 11 
for k j - 1, j l 2 
for k > j 
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma Al and A3 of Appendix A, 
With the above Lemma in hand, we can use exactly the same 
23 
methods as in the previous section, Specifically, the countable state 
Markov chain defined by equations (5,7) - (5.9) can be used to bound 
the majority process as we11. I,e, for all x s X, if x e Aj' 
We then get the following Theorem for the majority process: 
(6.7) 
Theorem 2, Given a Markov process p satisfying Assumptions 1 - 3, a 
limiting distribution, p•, exists, Furthermore, the limiting 
distribution is more concentrated on the sets Bk than the process S. 
I.e., for a11 k 
Proof: If P(x0) = 6 for some x0 a I
m, then p•(A) = X A(x0) is a 
stationary distribution, In this case, from Davis, Degroot and Hinich 
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[1972], it follows that x0 is a total median. Therefore Y• the center 
of B0 is at x0, and t. the diameter of B0 is zero. So p•(Bk) = 1 for 
all k, satisfying the inequality required. If P(x) F 6 for all 
x E Im, then replacing the sets Bk by Ilk and Ak by �· the proof is 
exactly the same as the proof of Theorem l, 
0, E, D, 
Since McKelvey' s theorem ensures that i.m itself will be the 
unique ergodic set for p (all states communicate), a direct 
consequence of Theorem 2 is that any subset of i.m with positive 
measure will be assigned positive probability under the stochastic 
solution, The final section looks at the concentration of this 
distribution. 
7 , CONCENmATION OF TIIE LIMITING DIS1RIBUTION 
We have shown that the limiting distribution, p•, of the 
Markov voting processes can be bounded by the cumulative density of 
the limiting distribution of the countable state Markov chain, S, 
defined by (5,7) - (5.9), For any process satisfying Assumptions 1 
and 2, we have, for all k, 
(7.1) 
and for majority processes, we have, for all k 
25 
(7.2) 
In this section, we compute numerical values for the r• to obtain 
bounds on the concentration of p•, 
For actual computation we approximate the countably infinite 
process S by a finite state process and we perform a numerical 
integration to approximate the quantities µ[c"°(j, k)] of (5.4), The 
limiting distribution of S can be approximated to any degree of 
accuracy by starting with a large enough finite ''truncation'' of S 
(with all ''excess'' probability thrown into the largest available 
state), The computational results of Table I indicate that, at least 
for Euclidean dimensions between m 2 and m = 8, a finite 
approximation with 30 states (inside the ball B30 in �
m of radius 30,5 
Wet0) is more than adequate for three decimal place accuracy, 
therefore take the values in Table I as accurate estimates for the 
r: = ) s;, 
Jlk 
and hence, according to Theorems 1 and 2, as lower bounds 
of p•(Bk) or 
In the 
probability is 
two dimensional 
within B3 (or n3 
essentially all the probability 
higher dimensions appears to be 
case, note that over 72 percent of the 
if Assumption 3 is met) and that 
is within B8 , The situation for 
analogous. As might be expected, the 
distributions become less concentrated as m increases from 2 to 8; 
nevertheless, the results indicate that the entire distribution in Rm 
is essentially contained within the ball B2(ntl-2) having radius 
[2(mt2) + 1/2Jt0 , It seems unlikely that this exact pattern would 
continue in still higher dimensions, but we leave such investigation 
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for a later time and a larger computer budget, 
The above results give bounds on the percentage of the 
limiting distribution which must be within a given distance of the set 
B0 (or B0), It therefore is important to discuss the properties of 
the sets B0 and n0 as a function of the distribution of preferences. 
For general processes, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, the 
limits are on the probabilities of lying in Bk' Here we recall that 
B0 is the smallest closed ball containing all ideal points, Of course 
the diameter of this set will always be large in relation to the 
distribution of ideal points, and the diameter of B0 will not decrease 
with the symmetry of the ideal points or with larger numbers of 
voters, Hence, the bounds on p•(Bk) are weak. The important fact
here, however is that these bounds hold regardless of the form of 
p(A, x), as long as Assumption 1 is met, even for processes generated 
by coalition structures that are not proper. 
For majority processes, the results are much stronger, Recoll 
that the set B0 is a minimal sphere which intersects with every median 
hyperplane, We can think of B0 as a ''generalized median''· When the 
distribution of ideal points is symmetric, then there will be a unique 
total median (See Davis, Degroot and H inich [1972)), implying that B0 
will be a singleton set, consisting of that point. In that case, of 
course, there is a core, and the limiting distribution will be the 
distribution assigning the core probability one and all other points 
probability zero, 
In the more usual case, when there is no total median, all 
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Dimensions 
Lower Bounds on 
General Majority 
Process Process 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
p*(BO) P*CBo) .ooo 
.ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .000 
p*(Bl) p*(Bl) .131 .024 .003 
,001 .ooo .000 ,000 
p*(B2) p* (B2) 
.432 .141 .037 .008 .002 .ooo .000 
p*(B3) p*CB3) 
.723 .364 .139 .043 .011 .003 .001 
p*(B4) r*CB4) 
.896 .613 .319 .133 .046 .014 .003 
p*(B5) P*CB5) 
.969 .805 .534 .284 .125 .046 .015 
p*(B6) r*(B6) 
.992 .917 . 724 .4 70 ,253 .115 .045 
p*(B7) p*(B7) 
.998 .970 .858 .652 .417 ,226 .106 
p*(B8) p*(B8) 
.999 .991 .936 .796 .587 .372 .203 
p*(B9) p*(B9) 
1.0 .997 .975 .894 .736 .530 .333 
p*(BlO) p*(B10) 
.999 .991 .950 .84 7 .678 .4 79 
p*(Bll) p* (Bll) 1.0 .99
7 . 979 .919 .798 .623 
p*(Bl2) p*(Bl2) 
.999 .992 .961 .883 .748 
p*(Bl3) p*(B13) 
1.0 .997 .983 .938 .844 
p*(Bl4) r*<B14) 
.999 .993 .970 .910 
p*(Bl5) p*(Bl5) 
1.0 .997 .986 .952 
p* (Bl6) P*CB16) 
.999 .994 .976 
p*(Bl7) P*<B17) 
1.0 .998 .989 
p*(BlB) p*(BlB) 
.999 .995 
p*(Bl9) p*CB19) 
1.0 .998 
p*(B20) p*(B20) 
.999 
p*(B21) P* (B21) 
1.0 
TABLE l* 
Lower Bounds on the Limiting Distribution, p*, of the Markov 
Process 
* * 
*Entries in kth row of each column are rk = E s. of the
 dominating process s. 
j2_ k J 
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points communicate, and the results of the previous section apply. In 
this case, the set B0 will be a sphere whose diameter is a measure of
the degree of nonsymmetry present in the distribution of ideal points, 
Thus, the more symmetric the distribution, the smaller will be the 
diameter of B0 and the more concentrated will be the distribution of 
A second question concerns the location of the set B0 in the 
relation to the ideal points of the voters. Kramer [1977), in a 
recent article defines a set, called the minimax set, consisting of 
those points which can be beaten by the fewest number of votes, 
Kramer shows that the minimax set is a centrally located subset of the 
Pareto optimals, and shrinks to a point as the number of voters 
increases. It also follows, from results of his, that B0 has a 
nonempty intersection with the minimax set (see [Kramer 1981)), and 
that as n -> w the minimax set will be a strict subset of B0• It 
follows that the limiting distribution of the Markov process defined 
by p(•lx) will be centered around the minimax set, being more or less 
concentrated as the symmetry of the distribtion of ideal points 
increases, 
Finally, we note that all the above conclusions depend on the 
particular transition process assumed in Assumption 1, Changing these 
assumptions could drastically alter the above results. For example, 
it is possible to imagine alternative assumptions on the transition 
probability function p(' ,x) which would lead to situations where a 
limiting probability fails to exist, Let X = Im and assume that ideal 
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points are situated so that no majority rule equilibrium exists (this 
is ''almost always'' the case, as follows from Plott [1967)), Given 
X s Im, find a nonnegative integer j such that x B Aj. The theorem in 
McKelvey [1976) then ensures that there will be a subset Ax 5:. Aj+l of 
positive Lebesgue measure such that yPMx (:Y y s Ax). If we define 
p(' ,x) to have support set Ax, for all x 6 I
m, it is clear that p( • ,x) 
fails to have a limiting distribution and its Markov process will be 
transient, By modifying the definition so that p('lx) has a larger 
support set intersecting Ak-l' Ak and Ak+l' we could arrange things so 
that p(' ,x) was either null recurrent (p• = 0) or so it was stationary 
with a limiting distribution requiring arbitrarily large balls Bk to 
contain most of the probability, 
We do not formalize the above ideas; but they do suggest, in 
line with llaKelvey' s result, that under sufficiently contrived 
assumptions about the transition process, literally anything can 
happen, Under more natural assumptions such as Assumption 1, however, 
a limiting probability must exist, and it will tend to concentrate 
near the Pareto set, While there are other reasonable assumptions 
about group preference besides that of Assumption 1 it seems they 
would generally lead to transition probabilities which are even more 
concentrated towards the minimax set, Accordingly our existence 
results still apply and even better lower bounds would be expected for 
limiting probabilities, 
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Af PENPIX A 
This appendix computes bounds for the transition probability 
Px(Bk)' To do this, we need to first develop limits on the set P(x) 
of points that beat a given point, It turns out that the set P(x) can 
be bounded, in a wide class of situations, by a pair of cardioids, So 
we first present general formuli for a cardioid in Im and for its 
volume, 
Let 0(x) = (01(x), 02(x), ,,,, 0m--l(x), p(x)) denote the m 
dimensional, spherical coordinates of the vector x s Im. Thus 
and, for 1 i i i m - 1, 
p(x) I lxl I 
sin-1 [ 
xi 
] p(x)lT cos 0.(x) 
j (i J 
Here, the 0j range between -� and �, except 0n-l' which ranges between 
-� and � · Now pick x•, y• B Im, t0 s l, and set t"' 2llx• - y•ll. 
Let Q be an m x m orthonormal rotation matrix such that 
write Q(x - x•) = Cz1, • • •  , zm) "' z. Then define 
ex•, y•(x) "'0(Q(y• - x•)) "'0(z). So ex•, y•(x) are m dimensional 
spherical coordinates of x which are centered at x• and have one axis 
orthogonal to the vector y• - x•, Now set 
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where -� i a i f. 
So that the above is also well defined for the case when lt01 2. t, we 
use the convention that, for r s I, lrl 2. 1, sin-1r � sgn r. We 
then set 
if m ) 2 
if m"' 2 
Then, define, for t0 s I, 
{x s X I 0 i p(z) i tsin01(z) + t0, 
and 
Thus, cmcx•, y•, to> is the m=dimensional cardioid which has cusp at x•,
t center at y•, eccentricity of t0, and .!'.fil!iil§. of 2 • See Figure Al. 
Note that if t0 "'O, then cfl(x•, y•, t0) becomes a sphere, with center 
at y• and diameter t. If t0 < O, then the resulting cardioid is 
contained in this sphere, otherwise it contains the sphere. Also note 
that if t0 < -t, then d11Cx•, y•, t0) "' 6. We adopt the following 
shorthand notation: If x0 = (0, 0, ,,,, 0), and yo"' (t, O ,  • • •  , O), then 
we write 
Note that for arbitrary x•, y• B Im, if t"' llx• - y•ll, then 
This follows because the transformation Q(x - x•) is just a 
translation and rotation, So we only need to compute µ[c1'1(t, t0)] . 
Now, using the fact that the Jacobian of the transformation to 
spherical coordinates is given by 
J = Pn-1 �cos n-i+19 
i�l i 
(See Kendall [1961] , p, 17), we get: 
.n. 
Sp st sin G1+to m-1 m-2 • • • a o p cos e1 
J� cosm-3 G2 • • • cos 9n_2dG2 . • •  dGn_2 ] 
2 
m-1 
.n. 
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(A6) 
2 (t sin 91 + t0)
m 
- 2.zL.:_ J2 -----=----''--- cosm-2e d0 - r (nr;l) a m 1 1 (A7) 
Here, the evaluation of the m-2 fold integral in the last step follows 
from results of Kendall ( [1961] , p. 35). 
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We can now prove the following key lemma, For this 1 emma, the 
transition process p(A, x) and the sets Di(x), etc., are us defined in 
the text. ( See Assumption 1,) 
Lemma Al. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be met, and assume there exists an 
y• s Im and t0 s I such that for all x e Im, and all 1 i i i J, 
Then, setting, for j 2.. 0 
and 
(where D_1 6), and defining, for j, k 2.. 0, 
it follows that 
(a) q 2.. I' [C
m(2k + 1,0)] 
j, k µ [c1'1(2j + 1,1)] 
(b) q 2.. Jl[Cm(2J - 1,-1)] j, k µ [c1'1(2j + 1, 1)]
(c) 
for 0 i k i j - 2 ,  j 2.. 2 
or k = j, j 2.. 1 
for k = j - 1 , j 2.. 2 
for k > j 
Proof, Note that if j 2.. 1, and x s Aj, then setting t 
we have t > t0• Dy assumption of the lemma, 
So 
for all 1 i i i J, But if µ[D1(x)] F 0 for all i, then we can write 
k 
� b1(x)pi(Bk,x) i{;l 
µ(Bk n D1Cx)) pi(Bk,x) = µ(D (x)) i 
Further } bi(x) = 1, so p(Bk,x) is a convex combinationn of the 
qi = inf pi(Bk,y),j,k A ys j 
when j L 1, it is sufficient to show that, for all i, the bounds in 
i (a), (b) and (c) hold for the qj,k' 
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Note that the only oase in whioh we can have j = 0, arises in 
(c), This will be treated as a separate subcase, In all other cases, 
since we only need to show that the inequalities of (a), (b), and (c) 
hold for the q�,k' we can drop the subscripts and superscripts on i, 
and assume, without loss of generality, that Pi(Bk,x) is of the form 
where 
D(x) 
We prove (a), (b) and (c) in turn, 
(a) I.et x s Aj. There are 2 cases.
µ(Bk n D(x)) 
µ(D(x)) 
Case I: 0 i k i j - 2 ,  j L 2 ,  Here, 
but then 
p(Bk,x) 
µ [D(x) n Bk ] 
µ [D(x) 1 
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Since µ[cIDC2llx - y•ll,t0)J is monotone increasing in llx - y•ll, 
to 
it follows that this is maximized when llx - y•ll = jt0 + z-· So 
= 11£Cm(2k + 1,0)] 
µ [c;'ll(2j + 1, 1)]
Case II, k = j, j l 2. 
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Here, the worst case occurs when x is on the outside boundary of 
Aj' so D(x) - Bk is as large as possible, Since D(x) must be 
starlike from x, this worst case occurs when 
µ [D(x) n Bk] µ [C
m(x, y•, t0) n Bk] 
µ [D(x)] L µ[Cm(x, y•, to> l 
µ [Bk] = 11[Cm(2k + 1,0)] 
µ [Cm((2J + l)t0, t0)J µ [Cm(2j + 1,1)]
Since the above holds for all x s Aj, the result follows,
(b) k =j - 1, jl2. 
Let x s Aj, Also pick x
1 s Aj and x
2 e Aj (here A denotes the 
closure of A) such that 
( j - !.) t 2 0 
�nd such that for some r1,r2 e I+, 
x1 = y• + r1(x - y•) 
x2 = y• + r2(x - y•) 
It follows that 
Also 
Hence 
µ [D(x) n Bk] µ [C
m(x1, y•, -t0) n Bk] 
µ(D{x)] l 
µ [Cm{{2J - l)to, to> l = 11rcmc21 - 1.l)J 
µ [c;'ll((2J + l)t0 , t0> J  µ [c;'ll(2J + 1, 1)J 
So the result follows, 
(c) k > j, Here there are two subcases,
Case I. j 'I O. 
Pick x s Aj' Then 
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So 
But then 
µ[Bk n D(x)] 
µ[D(x)] 
ufD(x)] 
µ [D(x)] 1 
Since this is true for all x, the result follows. 
Case II. j O. 
37 
Here we cannot write p(Bk, x) as a convex combination of the 
p(Bk, x) 
' ai(x)µ(D1.(x) n Bk) i�l 
But now, for all x s A0 B0, we have, by the assumptions of the 
Lemma, 
So 
Lemma A2, Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be met, Let 
Q,E,D. 
B0 = {x e l.
m I 2 1 Ix - y•l I .S. t0} for y• s l.
m and t0 e I. and assume 
xi B B0 for all i e N. Then for all x e l.
m and for all 1 .S. j .S. J, 
Proof: Pick x e l.m, Without loss of generality, we can assume the 
coordinate system is such that 
Y• _ llx - y•ll x = (0,, , , , 0), - ( 2 , 0, , ., , 0). Now, by assumption 2, for 
each i e N, 
where ti = 2llx - xiii. Using the fact that xi B B0, it can be
verified that 
I.e. for all i s N 
But then, since for any C 5:_ N, PC(x) = n P1(x), it follows that, for ieC 
any C, 
F inally, since Dj(x) = U Pc(x)
Ce.fli
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Q. E.D. 
Lemma A3, Let Assumptions 1 - 3 be met. Let 
B0 = (x elm I 2llx - yll i t}, for y e lm, and t el. Assume that 
for every hyperplane ll(a,c), with a elm, c al, if ll(a,c) is a median 
hyperplane, then nca,c> n i0 � �. Then 
d11(x,y,-t) :::_ P(x) :::_ d11(x,y,t). 
Proof: Pick x elm. Let t =  llx - yll. We choose coordinates so that 
B0 is centered at (f,o, . • •  ,O), ( which translates to (�10, • • •  ,0,f) in 
spherical coordinates), and so that x is at the origin. Now 01 (or 
actually � - 01) measures the angle an arbitrary point 
Y = (01'''''0n-l'r) makes with the axis between the origin and the 
center of B0• If we consider all points on the ray from the origin 
thru y, we oan easily characterize those points which can be in P(x). 
As illustrated in Figure Al, any median hyperplane in the direction y 
must be between the two extreme possibilities illustrated by � and 
H2, whicl1 are tangent to n0• 
For example, in the illustration, H is a possible median, But 
the set of points on the ray, L, which beat x are the points up to but 
not including the point on L which is twice the distance from x to the 
median hyperplane. In fact this point, indicated by the point b in 
the diagram, divides the set of points on L which beat x from those 
which are beate11 by x. We want to find limits on where this dividing 
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point occurs. This will clearly be the segment between 2b1 and 2b2, 
To obtain formulas for these points, note that the distance to c is 
t given by 2 sin 01, so we have, adding the radius of B0 , that 
t to b2 = 2 sin 01 + �· or 
Similarly 
(A2) 
(A3) 
Now p(01) = t sin 01 + t0 is simply the formula for an n 
dimensional cardioid with cusp at the orgin with underlying diameter 
of t and eccentricity of t0• It follows, from the above argument that 
in any other direction, at angle 01 from the origin, the same 
reasoning applies, so that the set of points that is majority 
preferred to x will be some set whose boundary lies between the inner 
and outer cardioids defined by equations (A2) and (A3), and whose 
boundary intersects each half ray through the origin at most once. 
Figure A2 illustates a possible set in the two dimensional case. 
Clearly the same exact argument applies in the m dimensional case. 
Further, it follows that the outer cardioid is an ''upper bound'' on how 
big this set can be, while the inner cardioid is a ' 'lower bound''· The 
volumes of these sets provide upper and lower bounds for the volume of 
the set P(x), Summarizing we have 
L 40a 
Figure Al 
Figure A2 
41 
cD1(x,y,-t) � P (x) � cD1(x,y,t), 
which is what we wanted to show. 
Q.E.D. 
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